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The judicial influence of the principle of mutual recognition for 
the free movement of goods in European Union Law and its 
workability1 
La influencia judicial del principio de reconocimiento mutuo en la libre circulación de mercancías 
en el Derecho de la Unión Europea y su operacionalidad 
 
Philipp Peter Haubold 
hauboldp@gmx.de 
Universidad de Heidelberg, alumno de intercambio en la facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de 
Chile durante el año 2015. 
 
Abstract: The principle of mutual recognition concerning the free movement of goods has 
played a key role for the development of doctrine in European Union Law. With the cases 
Dassonville, Keck and Cassis de Dijon the European Court of Justice has founded this principle 
of mutual recognition which has been more and more in competition with direct regulations 
of European bodies. The principle has often been questioned due to a large amount of 
problems resulting from this non-regulative principle whose legal bases are not even clearly 
defined and require a judicial interpretation. 
Key words: Free movement of goods – Mutual recognition – European Union Law 
 
Resumen: El principio del reconocimiento mutuo relativo a la libre circulación de 
mercancías ha tenido un rol clave en el desarrollo de la doctrina en el Derecho de la Unión 
Europea. Con los casos Dassonville, Keck y Cassis de Dijon, la Corte Europea de Justicia ha dado 
lugar a este principio, el cual ha entrado más y más en competencia con las regulaciones 
directas emitidas por los órganos europeos. Él ha sido a menudo cuestionado debido a la gran 
cantidad de problemas que surgen de tratarse de un principio no-regulatorio cuyas bases 
legales no están aun claramente definidas y requieren de interpretación judicial. 
Palabras clave: Libre circulación de mercancías – reconocimiento mutuo – Derecho de la 
Unión Europea.   
 
                                                          
1
  Artículo enviado el 06.07.2015 y aceptado el 10.12.2015. 
The judicial influence of the principle of mutual recognition for the free movement of goods   
Philipp Peter Haubold 
 
 
 
 
144 
1. Introduction: Contextualization of mutual recognition 
 
Mutual recognition is one of the three approaches on how to promote the free movement of goods in 
the European Union along with harmonization and liberalization2. It origins from the idea to facilitate 
the exercise of the fundamental freedoms in the European Union (EU)3. Named principle is based on 
the (mutual) trust4  that Member States have equivalent regulatory objectives in health, safety, 
environment and consumer protection5. The principle of mutual recognition’s aim is to promote 
market integration and to eliminate the dividing effect of different standards of Member States without 
harmonizing them and shortening the Member States’ autonomy6. The principle of mutual recognition 
exerts its function in particular in areas, where national characteristics are not to be standardized EU-
wide, but the omission of unification of law reduces the adjustment pressure in favor of national 
sovereignty aspects7. 
Historically, the principle of mutual recognition has passed three functions: it first served to justify 
national sovereignty, afterwards as a mode of intergovernmental cooperation and only then as 
European Law, which will be the focus of this research paper8. The EU first started to establish a 
customs union9 in 1957 building the heart of the Single Market of the European Union (art. 28 I f. 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU)10. The abolition of customs duties on 
imports and exports and of all measures having equivalent effect as well as the adaption of a common 
customs tariff in their relations with third countries built the basis of the free circulation of goods11. 
However, the free movement of goods has still not been absolutely fulfilt, as norms exist in Member 
States which are opposed to it12.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2  PELKMANS, Jacques.  “Mutual recognition: economic and regulatory logic in goods and services”, Bruges European Economist 
Research Papers, 24. Brugge, College of Europe, 2012, p. 5. 
3  SCHEUERMANN, Sandra. Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen Anerkennung im geltenden und künftigen Europäischen Strafrecht. Hamburg, 
Verlag Dr. Kovac, 2009, p. 5. 
4  MÜLLER-GRAFF, Peter-Christian. “Gegenseitige Anerkennung im Europäischen Unionsrecht”, ZvglRWiss, 2012, (111): p. 
73. 
5  PELKMANS, “Mutual recognition...”, op.cit., p. 5. 
6  SCHEUERMANN, Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen..., op.cit., p. 5. 
7  STREINZ, Rudolf. Schwerpunktbereich Europarecht. 9å ed. München, C.F. Müller Verlag, 2012, recital 960 ff. 
8  SCHEUERMANN, Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen..., op.cit., p. 5. 
9  Treaty of Rome, (298 U .N .T.S. 11) (1957). 
10  SCHMIDT, Susanne. “Gefangen im ‘lock in’? Zur Pfadabhängigkeit des Europäischen Gerichtshofs”. dms – der moderne Staat 
– Zeitschrift für Public Policy, Recht und Management, 2010, (2): p. 570. 
11  In gerneral about the free movement of goods e.g. MAYER, Franz. “Die Warenverkehrsfreiheit im Europarecht. Eine 
Rekonstruktion”. EuR, 2003, (5): pp. 783 ff. 
12  JANSSENS, Christine. The principle of mutual recognition in EU law. Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 109. 
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2. Cornerstones in the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice 
 
The free movement of goods is part of the primary legislation of the EU and is regulated in 
art. 26 ff. TFEU13. It has direct validity and establishes direct rights and obligations for all 
citizens of the EU14. As for the free movement of goods, according to art. 30 ff. TFEU, 
custom duties on imports and exports as well as “measures having an equivalent effect are 
prohibited between Member States” and mentioned regulations are directly applicable15. In 
contrast to secondary legislation, Member States do not have to enforce measures and do not 
have any discretion in the area of the four freedoms according to art. 288 II TFEU16. National 
administrative authorities or courts have to respect and apply the free movement of goods just 
like all the other organs, according to art. 34 TFEU17, “as measures having equivalent effect” 
are prohibited18. It turned out that not only discriminating measures, which hinder the free 
movement of goods, are forbidden, but also that by the judgments Dassonville, Cassis de Dijon 
and Keck the discrimination ban, according to art. 34 f. TFEU (based on art. 18 TFEU) 
evolved to a restriction ban19. A restriction ban goes much further than a disrimination ban 
making it possible to have the interpretation of “measures” not only of the home country but 
also of the host country revised20. Hence, by this wider interpretation of a restriction ban, the 
Member States are unable to possess any longer the competence to freely regulate imports and 
exports of national and EU citizens21. The three judgments merely paved the way for mutual 
recognition as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) used its discretionality to regulate the free 
movement of goods in the EU developing the principle of mutual recognition and making EU 
legislation or harmonization for many cases superflous22.  
 
2.1. The case Dassonville 
2.1.1. Facts 
In Dassonville the ECJ was confronted with the fact, that Belgian law provided that goods 
bearing a designation of origin could only be imported if they were accompanied by a 
certificate from the government of the exporting country certifying their right to such a 
                                                          
13  ECJ, Case C-83/78, Pigs Marekting Board (1978) ECR I-2347; EHLERS, Dirk. Europäische Grundrechte und Grundfreiheiten. 3å 
ed. Berlin. Verlag de Gruyter Recht, 2009, § 7. recital 7 ff.. 
14  EHLERS, Europäische Grundrechte..., op.cit., § 7. recital 7. 
15  EHLERS, Europäische Grundrechte..., op.cit., § 7. recital 7. 
16  STREINZ, Schwerpunktbereich..., op.cit., recital 448 ff. 
17  Former Article 28 EC. 
18  STREINZ, Schwerpunktbereich..., op.cit., recital 448 ff. 
19  EHLERS, Europäische Grundrechte..., op.cit., § 7. recital 28.  
20  SCHMIDT, Susanne.“Notwendigerweise unvollkommen – die Realisierung des Binnenmarkts”, Zeitschrift für Staats- und 
Europawissenschaften, 2005, 3(2): p. 188. 
21  SCHMIDT,“Notwendigerweise unvollkommen...”, op.cit., p. 188. 
22  SCHMIDT,“Notwendigerweise unvollkommen...”, op.cit., p. 189. 
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designation23. Dassonville imported Scotch whisky into Belgium from France without being in 
possession of the requisite certificate from the British authorities24. Such a certificate would 
have been very difficult to obtain in respect of goods which were already in free circulation in a 
third country25. Dassonville was prosecuted in Belgium and argued by way of defense that the 
Belgian national penal provisions26 are in breach against the EU law- guaranteed free 
movement of goods, as it constituted a measure that has an equivalent effect to a quantitative 
restriction of trade and is therefore inapplicable27. 
2.1.2. Judgment and importance 
Although in Dassonville the principle of mutual recognition is not explicitly mentioned, it still is 
the central foundation for the development of mutual recognition28. The judicature of the ECJ 
in the case Dassonville forms the basis of the principle of mutual recognition29. Before the 
Dassonville judgment in 1974 for a long time the term of a “measure having equivalent effect”30 was 
hotly disputed and was increasingly clarified in the recent years31. By defining a measure that 
has an equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction of trade as “all trading rules enacted by 
Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, 
intra-comunity trade” (Dassonville-formula), it interpreted a “measure” according to the arts. 28 
and 30 TEEC32. It was judged that such a provision is incompatible with the free movement of 
goods33.  
As for this very broad Dassonville-formula, almost all advertising and traffic prohibitions of the 
Member States affect the free movement of goods, as they may be likely to hinder the volume 
of trade, since they limit the opportunity of selling products34. The wide interpretation of the 
ECJ of measures causes that any product that is manufactured in a Member State in accordance 
to local law and placed on its market is to be marketable in any other Member State35. It would 
be an unjust limitation of community trade, when a regulation hinders the marketability of a 
product, which has already lawfully entered another Member States’ market36. Thus, the 
Member State can no longer apply national law relating to the infringement of the free 
                                                          
23  ECJ, Case C-8/74, Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville (1974) ECR I-837. 
24  ECJ, Case C-8/74, Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville (1974) ECR I-837. 
25  ECJ, Case C-8/74, Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville (1974) ECR I-837. 
26  Art. 1 of the Belgian Royal Decree Nr. 57 of 20. December 1934. 
27  ECJ, Case C-8/74, Procuredeur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville (1974) ECR I-837; HECKER, Bernd. Europäisches 
Strafrecht. 3å ed. Berlin. Verlag C. H. Beck, 2010, § 9. recital 10 ff. 
28  GLESS, Sabine. “Zum Prinzip der gegenseitigen Anerkennung”, ZStW, 2004, 116 (2): p. 354. 
29  SCHEUERMANN, Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen..., op.cit., p. 24; SCHÜTZ, Hans-Joachim. “Die klassische Entscheidung Cassis de 
Dijon”, Jura, 1998, pp. 633 f. 
30  ECJ, Case C-3/69, Social Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders (1969) ECR I-211. 
31  GROEBEN, H.,THIESING J. and EHLERMANN, C. D. Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag. 3å ed. Baden-Baden. Nomos, 1983,  p. 
253.  
32  SCHEUERMANN, Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen..., op.cit., p. 25. 
33  ECJ, Case C-8/74, Procuredeur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville (1974) ECR I-837; SCHEUERMANN, Das Prinzip 
der gegenseitigen..., op.cit., p. 25. 
34  SCHEUERMANN, Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen..., op.cit., p. 25. 
35  PELKMANS, “Mutual recognition...”, op.cit., p. 6. 
36  SCHEUERMANN, Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen..., op.cit., p. 25. 
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movement of goods, after the product entered lawfully the market and must follow the norms 
of other Member State37. It is this obligation under EU law, to accept the law of another 
Member State to overcome the divisive effect of different, non-harmonized national standards, 
which forms the content of the principle of mutual recognition38.  
The ECJ also said that such measures must not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination 
or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States39. That may be the case with 
formalities, required by a Member State for the purpose of proving the origin of a product, 
which only direct importers are really in a position to satisfy without facing serious 
difficulties40. The question whether the measures adopted for that purpose are proportionate 
or not, they logically remain separate issues which has further on been proved in several 
judgments41. The particular statement in the Dassonville judgment, defining that a Member State 
in general is allowed to take measures to prevent unfair (commercial) practices, is subject to the 
condition that these measures should be reasonable42. Therefore, Dassonville is to be seen as a 
forerunner of the rule of reason, as developed in Cassis de Dijon and subsequent case law43. 
 
2.2. The case Keck 
In the Keck judgment, the ECJ tried to clarify the scope of art. 34 TFEU almost 20 years after 
Dassonville and restricted the purview of the principle of mutual recognition considerably by 
limiting the Dassonville-formula44.   
2.2.1. Facts 
In the judgment Keck, two businessman were being prosecuted in France for reselling products 
in an unaltered state at prices lower than their actual purchase price including taxes (“resale at a 
loss”), which is prohibited by French national law45. In their defense, the prosecuted argued 
that this general prohibition on a resale at a loss reinforced by the Strasbourg Regional court is 
incompatible with art. 34 TFEU46. 
 
 
                                                          
37  SCHEUERMANN, Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen..., op.cit., p. 25. 
38  SCHEUERMANN, Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen..., op.cit., p. 25. 
39  ECJ, Case C-8/74, Procuredeur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville (1974) ECR I-837. 
40  ECJ, Case C-8/74, Procuredeur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville (1974) ECR I-837. 
41  GORMLEY, Laurence W. “Free Movement of Goods and Their Use – What is the use of it?”, Fordham International Law 
Jornal, 2011, 33 (6) Article 1: p. 1593 f. 
42  ECJ, Case C-8/74, Procuredeur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville (1974) ECR I-837. 
43  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 13; STREINZ, Schwerpunktbereich..., op.cit., recital 817. 
44  ECJ, Case C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard (1993) ECR I-6097; compare with: ECJ, Case C-155/80, Oebel (1981) ECR I-
1993; STREINZ, Schwerpunktbereich..., op.cit., recital 881. 
45  ECJ, Case C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard (1993) ECR I-6097. 
46  ECJ, Case C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard (1993) ECR I-6097. 
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2.2.1. Judgment 
The ECJ stated that certain selling arrangements47 to products from other Member States fall 
outside the purview of the prohibition laid down by art. 34 TFEU48. This is the case “so long 
as those provisions apply to all relevant traders operating within the national territory […] so 
long as they affect in the same manner, in law and in fact, the marketing of domestic products 
and of those from other Member States” (Keck-formula)49. This implies, that selling 
arrangements do not establish an infringement as they have no major impact on imports than 
on national goods and consequently are not contained in art. 34 TFEU. Hence, there would no 
longer be a duty of mutual recognition, which would apply to the latter category of rules50. For 
the first time, the ECJ made a reduction of facts of measures according art. 34 TFEU in Keck51. 
2.2.1. Importance 
The justification of Keck was established on two bases. Firstly, the ECJ explained that such 
rules are not designated to determine inter-state trade52. Secondly, it was argued that such rules 
do not limit market access, or at least not to a greater extent for imports than for national 
goods53. For that reason, they are not measures having an equivalent effect54. Art. 34 TFEU 
consequently solely applies to rules that have a greater effect on foreign than on national goods 
(discrimination)55. Nevertheless, product norms would be subject to an obligation to mutual 
recognition, whereas particular norms on selling arrangements- which applied to all relevant 
traders operating within the Member States’ territory and which influenced the marketing of 
foreign and domestic products in the same manner – would no longer be part of the purview 
of art. 34 TFEU56. 
The difference of selling arrangements and product rules has often been proven difficult to 
apply in practice57. Further on, the ECJ did not dare to introduce a third category of measures, 
which would fall outside the scope of art. 34 TFEU and its mutual recognition mechanisms58.  
 
                                                          
47  Selling arrangements are measures which are associated with the marketing of the good rather than with the characteristics 
of the good, see: ECJ, Case C-441/04, A-Punkt Schmuckhandel (2006) ECR I-2093. 
48  ECJ, Case C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard (1993) ECR I-6097. 
49  ECJ, Case C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard (1993) ECR I-6097. 
50  ECJ, Case C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard (1993) ECR I-6097, paras 15-16; commenting: GORMLEY, Laurence. W. 
“Reasoning Renounced? The remarkable judgment in Keck and Mithouard”, European Business Law Review, 1994, (3): p. 63-
7; JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 44. 
51  ECJ, Case C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard (1993) ECR I-6097. 
52  ECJ, Case C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard (1993) ECR I-6097. 
53  ECJ, Case C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard (1993) ECR I-6097. 
54  ECJ, Case C-268/91, Keck and Mithouard (1993) ECR I-6097. 
55  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 45. 
56  CRAIG, Paul. EU law, text, cases, and materials. 5å ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 655 f. 
57  ECJ, Case C-82705, Commission v Greece (2006) ECR I-93. 
58  GONZÁLEZ VAQUÉ, Luis. “La sentencia Mickelsson y Roos del TJCE: Good Bye, Keck y Mithouard!”, Revista española de 
Derecho Europeo, 2009, p. 389 ff. 
Revista Tribuna Internacional  
Volumen 4 • Nº 8 • 2015 • pp. 143-163 
ISSN 0719-482X (versión en línea)  
 
 
 
149 
Only recently has the ECJ shifted its case law towards another crucial element that was the 
base of the ECJs reasoning when judging national trade barriers since Keck, namely the market-
access test59. 
 
2.3. The case Cassis de Dijon 
2.3.1. Facts 
In the case Cassis de Dijon, the applicant intended to import a liqueur, “Cassis de Dijon”, into 
Germany from France60. A European regulation of the production and processing of this fruit 
liqueur did not exist at that time61. The German authorities refused to allow the importation 
because the French drink was not of sufficient alcoholic strength to be marketed in Germany62. 
The applicant argued that the German rule was a measure equivalent to quantitative restriction 
since it prevented the French version of the drink from being lawfully marketed in Germany63.   
2.3.2. Judgment 
The ECJ constanted that there is “no valid reason why, provided that they have been lawfully 
produced and marketed in one of the Member States, alcoholic beverages should not be 
introduced into any other Member State”64. It was clarified that “obstacles to the movement 
within the Community resulting from disparities between the national laws relating to the 
marketing of the products in question must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be 
recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular 
to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of 
commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer” (Cassis-formula)65. Since obstacles 
must be accepted only in the presence of certain mandatory requirements, the ECJ draws the 
conclusion that “(goods)66 lawfully produced and marketed in one of the Member States 
should be admitted into any other Member State without restriction and the product may not 
be subject to a legal prohibition of national rules”67. Consequently, Member States had to 
recognize the foreign product standards, as it was incompatible with art. 34 TFEU68. With this 
closing statement the Cassis judgment encapsulated the principle of mutual recognition69.  
                                                          
59  WEATHERILL, Stephen. “After-keck: Some thought on How to Clarify the Clarification”, Common Market Law Review, 1996, 
33 (5): p. 885 ff; JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 45. 
60  ECJ, Case C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon (1979) ECR I-649; affirmed in Directive 70/50/EEC. 
61  SCHEUERMANN, Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen..., op.cit., p. 26 f.. 
62  ECJ, Case C-120/78, de Dijon (1979) ECR I-649. 
63  ECJ, Case C-8/74, Procuredeur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville (1974) ECR I-837. 
64  ECJ, Case C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon (1979) ECR I-649; HUMMER, W. and VEDDER, C. Europarecht in Fällen – Die 
Rechtsprechung des EuGH, des EuG und deutscher und österreichischer Gericht. 4å ed. Baden-Baden. Nomos Verlag, 2005, p. 458. 
65  ECJ, Case C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon (1979) ECR I-664. 
66  Changed by the author and replaced by the word “goods”. 
67  ECJ, Case C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon (1979) ECR I-664. 
68  SCHEUERMANN, Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen..., op.cit., p. 25. 
69  BARNARD, Catherine. The substantive law of EU, The Four Freedoms. 3å ed. Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 624. 
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2.3.3. Importance 
The Cassis de Dijon judgment particulary was a development and clarification of the scale of the 
Dassonville-formula70. Already in Dassonville the possibility was apparent of applying art. 34 
TFEU to indistinctly applicable rules 71. The definition of a measure having an effect equivalent 
to quantitative restrictions in paragraph 5 of Dassonville did not require a measure to be 
discriminatory72. It stated that art. 34 TFEU could apply to national rules that did not 
discriminate against imported products, but rules that at the same time inhibited trade because 
they were different from the trade rules applicable in the country of origin73. Hence, the basic 
idea of the Dassonville-doctrine74 was further developed in the seminal Cassis de Dijon case with the 
affirmation of paragraph 5 Dassonville75.  
In general, the doctrine of the Cassis case-law was absolutely coherent with the Dassonville 
judgment76. Furthermore, this was confirmed as the Cassis ruling is based on paragraph 6 of 
Dassonville, in which the “rule of reason” was established containing that in the absence of 
harmonization, reasonable measures could be taken by state to prevent unfair trade practices 77. 
Besides, Cassis de Dijon established four mandatory requirements which could prevent a trade 
rule inhibiting the free movement of goods from being covered by art. 34 TFEU78. The ECJ 
wisely chose the word “particular”79 indicating a non-exhaustive enumeration of the unwritten 
justification reasons which replenish the written reasons80. It paved the way for additional 
justification reasons over the years, which normally are of non-economical nature such as road 
safety81, maintainance of press82 or environmental protection83.84 
ECJ also introduced a three-step test in Cassis de Dijon85. It is checked if firstly, there is no 
harmonized European measure on the matter that prevents the Member State from 
                                                          
70  CRAIG, EU law..., op.cit., p. 649. 
71  ECJ, Case C-8/74, Procuredeur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville (1974) ECR I-837; CRAIG, EU law..., op.cit., p. 
647. 
72  ECJ, Case C-8/74, Procuredeur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville (1974) ECR I-837; CRAIG, EU law..., op.cit., p. 
647. 
73  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 13. 
74  Coherent with the Dir 70/50, (1970) O.J. L13/29, Art 2(3). 
75  ECJ, Case C-8/74, Procuredeur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville (1974) ECR I-837; CRAIG, EU law..., op.cit., p. 
647. 
76  GROEBEN,THIESING and EHLERMANN, Kommentar..., op.cit., p. 263; ECJ, Case C-220/81, Robertson and others (1982) ECR 
I-2349. 
77  CRAIG, EU law..., op.cit., p. 649. 
78  CRAIG, EU law..., op.cit., p. 649. 
79  ECJ, Case C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon (1979) ECR I-664. 
80  CRAIG, EU law..., op.cit., p. 649. 
81  ECJ, Case C-314/98, Sneller's Autos Valgemeen Directeur van de Dienst Wegverkeer (2000) ECR I-8633; ECJ, Case C-
110/05, Commission v Italy (2009) ECR I-173. 
82  ECJ, Case C-368/95, Familiapress (1997) ECR I-3709. 
83  ECJ, Case C- 302/86, Commission v Denmark (1988) ECR I-4607. 
84  Vid. SCHEUERMANN, Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen..., op.cit., p. 28. 
85  KAPTEYN, P. J.G. et al. The law of the European Union and the European Communities. 3å ed. London. Kluwer Law International, 
1998, p. 645 ff.; JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 13. 
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regulating86. Secondly, an accepetable mandatory requirement of the Member State is 
required87. Thirdly, the ECJ checks if this national measure is adequate and proportionate to 
satisfy the mandatory requirement88. It is to state, that the test does indeed guarantee that the 
free movement of goods and mutual recognition are counterbalanced with interests considered 
worthy of protection from a EU and a Member State’s viewpoint89. Due to this test a 
restriction of the Dassonville-formula itself is limited due to the principle of proportionality90.91 It 
also allows the ECJ to excercise a great deal of discretion – usually with the result that the 
conclusions that the national measures concerned are unjustified92. Summing it up, Cassis de 
Dijon had a great impact being continued by numerous cases applying the Cassis principles to 
various trade rules where it was approved over and over again, leading to a reinforcement of 
the principle of mutul recognition93.  
2.3.4. The origin principle 
With the Cassis judgment also the country of origin principle was founded94. It serves as a base 
for the mutual recognition of  provisions and has been approved in further judgments95.  
In combination with the Single Market, the origin principle says that goods, which have been 
prepared properly under the legislation of a Member State and placed on the market, may 
generally be introduced to the EU market, excluding certain exceptions96. This principle 
implies that Member States, when developing trade regulations or technical regulations, which 
might affect the proper functioning of the free movement of goods, must not only consider 
them from a national perspective alone and take into account the needs of domestic products 
but also the legitimate aspirations of the other Member States97. It means that it is a kind of 
negative obligation not to apply a Member State’s regulation in case that its rule would 
establish an unjustified obstacle to the free movement of goods98. Finally, every Member State 
should aim to consider the rules of other EU counties in order to prevent its national rules of 
becoming unjustifiable impediment to the access of goods to another Member State’s market99. 
Due to the revision of the host country, all rules of their home country, which are subject to 
                                                          
86  KAPTEYN, The law of the European Union..., op.cit., p. 645 ff.; JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 13. 
87  KAPTEYN, The law of the European Union..., op.cit., p. 645 ff.; JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 13. 
88  KAPTEYN, The law of the European Union..., op.cit., p. 645 ff.; JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 13. 
89  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 13. 
90  Existing of: suitability, necessity, adequacy and porportionality in the narrow sense. 
91  ECJ, Case C-272/80, Frans-Nederlandse Matschapij Biologische Producten (1981) ECR I-3277. 
92  GORMLEY, Laurence W. “Free Movement of Goods...”, op.cit., p.1593. 
93  GROEBEN,THIESING and EHLERMANN, Kommentar..., op.cit., p. 263. 
94  REICH, Norbert. Understanding EU Law, Objectives, Principles and Methods of Community Law. Antwerpen, Intersentia, 2005, p. 
102. 
95  ECJ, Case C-220/81, Robertson and others (1982) ECR I-2349. 
96  ECJ, Case C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon (1979) ECR I-649. 
97  Communication from the Commission concerning the consequences of the judment given by the ECJ on 20 Febraury 
1979 in Case C-120/78 (Cassis de Dijon) O.C. J- 256, 03.10.1980, p. 3. 
98  MANKOWSKI, Peter. “Wider ein Herkunftslandprinzip für Dienstleistungen im Binnenmarkt”. IPRax, 2004, 24 (5): p. 392. 
99  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 39.  
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EU foreigners as producers of goods, become important100. In order to avoid double controls, 
which are disproportionate, all requirements of the country of origin have to be mutually 
recognized101. 
The objective behind the concept of mutual recognition with expression in the country of 
origin principle is to eliminate trade barriers, which result from different product or 
qualification standards of the Member States. As a consequence, it should create the conditions 
for a functioning Single Market without forcing harmonization or an unnecessary over-
regulation102. This preserves both regional characteristics and ensures trust between Member 
States103.  
 
3.  Legal Basis of European Union Law and interrelating principles 
 
In the former European Community (EC) Treaty, the term “mutual recognition” was referred 
to twice concerning companies (former art. 293 EC, abrogated by the Treaty of Lisbon) and 
diplomas (currently art. 53 TFEU104)105. Nonetheless, these two norms were not meant to 
function as a general judicial principle of mutual recognition rather as an “incentive” for the 
Member States and the Council to take the necessary (legislative) measure to promote the 
Single Market process106. It is therefore, that they cannot serve as a legal basis to the principle 
of mutual recognition107. 
However, the former Treaty art. 100 B EC, which was introduced by the Single European Act 
and abrogated by the Treaty of Amsterdam, could have served as a legal basis108. In this former 
Treaty measure, the Council was given the competence to decide that national provisions 
should be recognized as equivalent measures applied in other Member States when not having 
been harmonized with former art. 100 A EC by 1992 deadline109. Ultimately, the Council never 
applied the former art. 100 B EC110. Although this provision was partly seen as a threat to the 
Cassis case-law concerning mutual recognition, it could have also functioned as a “trailblazer” 
for the jurisdiction of the principle of mutual recognition with regard to the measures the 
                                                          
100  BEHRENS, Peter. “Die Konvergenz der wirtschaftlichen Freiheiten im europäischen Gemeinschaftsrecht”. EuR, 1992, (2): 
pp. 145 ff.; SCHNEIDER, Hartmut. “Zum Funktionswandel der Grundfreiheiten des EGV und zu seinen Auswirkungen auf 
das nationale Recht”. Neue Justiz, 1996, (50): p. 515.  
101  BEHRENS,“Die Konvergenz...”, op.cit., pp. 145 ff.; SCHNEIDER,“Zum Funktionswandel...”, op.cit., p. 515. 
102  SCHMIDT,“Notwendigerweise unvollkommen...”, op.cit., p. 192. 
103  SCHMIDT,“Notwendigerweise unvollkommen...”, op.cit., p. 192. 
104  Former Article 47 EC. 
105  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 24. 
106  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 24. 
107  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 24. 
108  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 24. 
109  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 24. 
110  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 24. 
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Council would have considered appropiate111. art. 100 B EC, former art. 293 EC, and art. 53 
TFEU at least may have inspired the ECJ for its case law and represent the relevance of 
mutual recognition for the Single Market idea112.   
 
3.1. Mutual Trust 
Due to the transfer of sovereignty, mutual trust is fundamental for the functioning of mutual 
recognition and the facilitation of the Single Market113, as the EU depends on the loyal 
cooperation of its Member States and their administrations for the establishment and 
application of common rules114. Because the reliance on mutual recognition both reflects and is 
grounded on the mutual trust between Member States that the European bodies claim115, it can 
be said that mutual trust is a precondition for mutual recongnition116.  
The ECJ emphasized the importance of mutual trust insisting that Member States trust each 
other to realize inspections on their respective territories117. The ECJ stated that the 
prohibition of dual burdens and double controls, as developed in its previous jurisdiction118, 
was a particular application of the broader principle of mutual trust between Member States 
authorities119. Although there was  no reference to the legal base upon which this principle had 
been established in the EU law, the Cassis case law can certainly be qualified as a legal base, 
apart form the principle of sincere cooperation120. 
 
3.2. Principle of sincere cooperation 
Although the ECJ neglected reference to Art 4 (3) TEU besides the diploma framework, it still 
has not kept various authors from claiming that the principle of mutual recognition can be 
considered as an expression of art. 4(3) TEU121. Nevertheless, in consideration of the wide 
                                                          
111  MATTHIES, Heinrich. “Zur Anerkennung gleichwertiger Regelungen im Binnenmarkt der EG (art. 100b EWG-Vertrag) ”, 
in: BAUR, J. F. and MAILANDER, K. P. (eds). Festschrift für Ernst Steindorff zum 70. Geburtstag am 13. März 1990. Berlin. Verlag 
DeGruyter, 1990, pp. 1287 ff. 
112  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 25. 
113  SCHMIDT,“Notwendigerweise unvollkommen...”, op.cit., p. 193 f. 
114  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 28. 
115  Green Paper of the Commission - Criminal law protection of he financial interests of the Community and the establishment of a European 
Prosecutor. COM (2001) 715 final.  
116  KÜHN BACA, Werner. “The principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions in EU Law in the light of the ‘Full faith 
and credit’ clause of the US constitution”, p. 11. Biblioteca Digital Andina [on line] 
<http://www.comunidadandina.org/BDA/docs/CAN-INT-0061.pdf> [accessed: Dec 20, 2015]. 
117  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 28, originating from: ECJ, Case C-46/76, Bauhuis (1977) ECR I-5, para 
22. 
118  ECJ, Case 272/80, Frans-Nederlandse Matschapij Biologische Producten (1981) ECR I-3277; JANSSENS, The principle of 
mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 28. 
119  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 28. 
120  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 28. 
121  KAPTEYN, The law of the European Union..., op.cit., p.155. 
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wording of this provision, one cannot persuade that the principle of sincere cooperation alone 
could be sufficient as a legal basis for the principle of mutual recognition122. If at all, it might be 
considered as a co-legal basis for the principle of mutual recognition, along with the specific 
free movement provisions123.  
 
3.3. Principle of proportionality 
It has been claimed that the principle of proportionality forms part of the basis of the principle 
of mutual recognition124. When investigating the rule of reasons test125, the ECJ analyses if a 
national measure serves a mandatory requirement and in the positive case, whether it is 
necesary and appropriate126. In case that the purpose that the national measure intents to 
safeguard is already protected by an equivalent rule in the Member State of origin, it is the 
principle of mutual recognition that dominates127. Thus, the principle of mutual recognition 
can be considered as originated from the principle of proportionality128. 
However, it is argued that the purview of mutual recognition cannot be reduced to a 
proportionality test, as it evolves relevant at an earlier point, particularly as a starting point 
when analyzing national measures potentially establishing obstacles to the free movement of 
goods129. 
Consequently, mutual recognition both prevails when dual burdens or equivalent legislations 
are regarded as unreasonable to a certain imperative requirement and apart from this, in the 
case of lacking any proportionality test, there is no solid mandatory requirement to defend the 
non-recognition or non-application of national legislation of other Member States130. Thus, the 
principle of proportionality is undoubtedly important, although inadequate as a legal basis for 
the principle of mutual recognition131.  
 
3.4. Principle of subsidiarity 
The principle of subsidiarity may be regarded as a legal basis for mutual recognition due to the 
Amsterdam Treaty and the Commissions’ “New Approach”132, manifesting subsidiarity133. 
                                                          
122  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 28. 
123  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 28. 
124  KAPTEYN, The law of the European Union..., op.cit., p.145. 
125  Hereinafter mentioned as: “three step test”. 
126  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 25. 
127  ECJ, Case C-251/78, Denkavit (1979) ECR I-3369, para 3; JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 26. 
128  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 26. 
129  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 26. 
130  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 26. 
131  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 26. 
132  Protocol on the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed to the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, O.J. 1997, C-340/1, para 8; JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 26. 
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Actually, mutual recognition as a judicially established principle is applied by the ECJ only 
where no harmonized measures exist and the national legislation of at least two Member States 
guide the conflict134. Subsidiarity, as a guiding principle for distributing the application of 
competence between the Member States and the EU, might be a point of departure of the 
EU’s legislative approach to the free movement of goods, but it has little influence on the 
judicially established principle of mutual recogntion. It is consequently insufficient as legal 
basis135. 
 
3.5. Treaty provisions 
Due to the great amount of principles interrelating with the principle of mutual recognition, it 
cannot be stated clearly what the legal basis of mutual recognition for the ECJ is136.  
Having analyzed the three most markable judgments of the ECJ on the free movement of 
goods, it seems that the Treaty provisions could be considered as the legal basis to the 
principle of mutual recognition. The ECJ seemed to ground its judgments on the wide 
interpretation of art. 34 TFEU137. In all cases, where the Member State had not respected the 
equivalent rule to which a product applied to in the country of origin, the ECJ justified it with 
a violation of art. 34 TFEU138. Simultaneously, obligations closely affiliated with mutual 
recognition, such as the requirement of an active approach or the obligation of cooperation 
with other Member States’ bodies, can be connected with the free movement of goods139. 
Besides, the ECJ has expressively recognized in recent judgments that art. 34 TFEU 
demonstrates the duty to respect the principle of mutual recognition140. 
Therefore, the principle of mutual recognition is basically a principle fundamental to the free 
movement Treaty concerning the free movement of goods, without independent purview or 
independent existence141 and thus is the most probable legal basis from the point of view of 
the ECJ for the principle of mutual recognition142. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
133  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 26. 
134  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 27. 
135  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 27. 
136  Example for combining serveral principles: Opinion of AG la Pergola in: ECJ, Case C-184/96, Commission v France 
(1998) ECR I-6197; JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 29 f.. 
137  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 30. 
138  In contrast to a some parties of the following cases who claimed a breach of „the principle of mutual recognition, the ECJ 
only refered to the Treaty provisions: ECJ, Case C-30/99, Commission v Ireland (2001) ECR I-4619, para 22; ECJ, Case 
C- 243/01, Gambelli (2003) ECR I-3031, para 29. 
139  ECJ, Case C-432/03, Commission v Portugal (2005) ECR I-9665, para 47 and 52. 
140  ECJ, Case C-345/08, Pesla (2009) ECR I-11677, para 38. 
141  MATTERA, Alfonso. “The principle of mutual recognition and respect for national, regional and local Identities and 
Traditions“, in SCHIOPPA, Fiorella (ed.). The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the European Integration Process. Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005, p. 9; JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 31. 
142  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 31. 
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4.  Limits of Article 34 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
 
The importance of mutual recognition for the Single Market of the EU can barely be 
overestimated143. In the areas where, at Community level, no harmonized laws exist, only the 
principle of mutual recognition ensures the free movement of goods. Nevertheless, it is for the 
Member States to establish a level of protection that they consider appropriate to legitimate 
objectives, such as environmental, health or consumer protection, to counterbalance the 
mandatory requirements with the free movement of goods by the principle of 
proportionality144.  
The import of a product that has been manufactured properly in another Member State and 
placed on the market can therefore be legally prevented only in two cases145. Firstly, if 
unequally applicable measures to foreign and national products exist, it is to regard the 
exceptions in art. 36 TFEU146 (which must be strictly interpreted)147: the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions, consumer 
protection and environmental protection148. 
In the opposed case of equally applicable measures to foreign and national products it is to 
refer to art. 36 TFEU and additionally to the mandatory requirements of public interest of the 
Cassis case law concerning its inherent non- exhaustive limits which are directly applicable149.150 
The list developed of overriding requirements to the public interests under the Cassis-
jurisdiction is still ongoing and continues to evolve151. Examples include environmental 
protection in the case of “Danish bottle recycling system”152 or the maintenance of media diversity 
in the event of “Familia Press”153.   
 
 
 
                                                          
143  CRAIG, EU law..., op.cit., p. 649. 
144  ECJ, Case C-333/08, Commission v France (2010) ECR I-757, para 87. 
145  STREINZ, Schwerpunktbereich..., op.cit., recital 831 ff. 
146  Public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the 
protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and 
commercial property Article 36 TFEU. 
147  ECJ, Case C-113/80, Commission v Ireland (1981) ECR I-1625; STREINZ, Schwerpunktbereich..., op.cit., recital 832. 
148  ECJ, Case C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon (1979) ECR I-649, para 8. 
149  ECJ, Case C-309/02, Radelberger (2004) ECR I-11763; ECJ, Case C-178/84, Commission v Germany (1987) ECR I-1227, 
para 583; ECJ, Case C-67/74, Bonsignore (1975) ECR I-297; ECJ, Case C-215/03, Salah OUlane (2005) ECR I-1215; 
STREINZ, Schwerpunktbereich..., op.cit., recital 841. 
150  ECJ, Case C-120/78, Cassis de Dijon (1979) ECR I-649, para 8. 
151  SCHMIDT,“Notwendigerweise unvollkommen...”, op.cit., p. 191. 
152  ECJ, Case C-302/86, Commission v Denmark (1988), ECR I-4607, paras 6 ff.. 
153  ECJ, Case C-368/95, Familiapress  (1997), ECR I-3689, paras 24 ff..  
Revista Tribuna Internacional  
Volumen 4 • Nº 8 • 2015 • pp. 143-163 
ISSN 0719-482X (versión en línea)  
 
 
 
157 
A Member State can only justify an infringement of this latter rules when fulfilling both 
elements of the principle of proportionality. Member States may differ from the principle of 
mutual recognition only under very strict conditions when taking measures to prevent or 
restrict access of a product from the national market154.  
For this purpose, the relevant provision must fulfill both elements of the principle of 
proportionality, implying necessity and appropriateness155. Concerning necessity, the regulation 
must firstly be based on scientific and technical relevant arguments and be necessary for others 
to ensure the protection of the consumer, health, etc.156. A rule is then appropriate (or 
proportionate in the narrow sense) if there is no alternative that protects the interest to be 
protected equally and as little impairing the free movement of goods157. Different national 
protection systems of the country of origin and destination do not play any role in examining 
the proportionality158. Only the goals or chosen level of protection of the determiner state are 
relevant for the analysis of necessity and appropriateness of the provision159. In examining the 
means-end relation of trade restrictions, the ECJ has increasingly applied the guarantees of the 
European Convention on Human Rights160. As requirements for the content of press products 
must be compatible with the protection of media diversity that guarantees freedom of 
expression according to art. 10 ECHR161.162 Ultimately, the Member State authorities must be 
able to be judicially reviewed for legality under EU law (effective legal protection in accordance 
with the Union fundamental rights)163.  
 
5.  Problems on mutual recognition and criticism 
 
While the ECJ is absolutely convinced to continue with the integrationist effects of intra-
Union market penetration, it cannot be negated that problems exist in how the free movement 
of goods in the Single Market, and the basis forming principle of mutual recognition operate in 
practice164. The EU did not meet the high expectations predicted by the Commission in its 
1985 White Paper and it has always been emphasized that the practical application of mutual 
                                                          
154  Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee – Second biennial report on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition in the Single Market. COM (2002) 419 final, p. 5. 
155  SCHEUERMANN, Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen..., op.cit., p. 30 f.; STREINZ, Schwerpunktbereich..., op.cit., recital 845. 
156  SCHEUERMANN, Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen..., op.cit., p. 30 f.. 
157  STREINZ, Schwerpunktbereich..., op.cit., recital 845 f. 
158  Shown in the ECJ judgments. 
159  SCHEUERMANN, Das Prinzip der gegenseitigen..., op.cit., p. 30 f.. 
160  ECJ, Case C-260/89, ERR v DEB (1991) ECR I-2925; STREINZ, Schwerpunktbereich..., op.cit., recital 845. 
161  ECJ, Case C-368/95, Familiapress (1997) ECR  I-3689, paras 24 ff.. 
162  HERDEGEN, Matthias. Europarecht. 4å ed. München. Verlag C. H. Beck, 2002, p. 242. 
163  ECJ, Case C-260/89, Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg (1993) ECR I- 1663, para 40; STREINZ, Schwerpunktbereich..., op.cit., 
recital 845. 
164  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 23. 
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recognition has been difficult165. In fact, there is a great variety of reasons for the imperfect 
functioning of the principle of mutual recongition in the EU166. 
 
5.1  Transfer of sovereignty 
Due to mutual recognition states do no longer control their markets independently as a 
horizontal transfer of sovereignty is caused from country A to country B by the concept of the 
origin principle167. Therefore, the decision on regulations is no longer taken necessarily in the 
jurisdiction where its consequences are noticeable168. The national state is no longer 
responsible and competent for the legislation on its own territory due to the home country 
control, as some of its consumers operate transactions with companies controlled by other 
Member States169. This transfer of sovereignty makes mutual recognition at a very precondition 
a full integration principle and also shows the origin of the problems, which the Single Market 
has to overcome170.  
 
5.2.  National thinking of administration correlating with distrust 
One of the problems is the fact that the heads of state and governement do not ensure their 
administrations to execute their political will into positive concrete results171. This includes the 
requirement to make the administrations think and act “European” rather than national172. 
This aspect is directly connected with the requirement of mutual trust among all Member 
States and discloses an alarming ignorance of the implications both of the principal of mutual 
recognition and a disturbing lack of trust in products or documents originating from other EU 
countries173.  
 
 
 
                                                          
165  Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee – Second biennial report on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition in the Single Market. COM (2002) 419 final, p. 2. 
166  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 106. 
167  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 106. 
168  APPELBAUM, R., FELSTINER, W. and GESSNER, V. Rules of Networks. The Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions. Oxford. 
Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 48. 
169  SCHMIDT,“Notwendigerweise unvollkommen...”, op.cit., p. 192. 
170  NICOLAÏDIS, Kalypso. Mutual Recognition Among Nations: The European Community and Trade in Services (PHD Dissertation). 
Harvard, 1993, p. 490 ff.. 
171  Second Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament – The implementation of the Commission’s White Paper on 
completing the internal market. COM (1987) 203 final, p. 24. 
172  See for instance: Communication from the Commission to the Council. the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions- Internal Market Strategy riorities 2003-2006. COM (2004) 22 final, p.7. 
173  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 107f. 
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5.3.  Legal uncertainty 
Member State officials do seem to feel a considerable degree of uncertainty about the scope 
and potential of the (judicial) principle of mutual recognition174. This deficit is promoted by the 
absence of specific procedural rules and the fact that there is no extra paperwork, which can be 
both considered as a strength or, in this case, as a weakness175. It prevents market operators 
from relying on the principle of mutual recognition forcing them to choose a market strategy 
of “risk avoiding”176. Therefore, many companies abstain from investing in and exporting to 
other Member States often due to a incalculatable fincancial risk177.  
 
5.4.  Insufficient transparency 
Thirdly, there is still very little transparency of the procedures concerning the free movement 
of goods178. No clear procedure exists for a company to follow in challenging negative 
decicions and no common standards to evaluate if different levels of protection are 
equivalent179. This also applies to areas where the ECJ has already delivered unequivocal 
judgments sentencing a specific measure or practice180.  
 
5.5.  Discrimination of residence and race to the bottom 
Due to the applicability of the fundamental freedoms only to cross-border situations, 
according to art. 34 TFEU181, residence of other Member States may be better off in a 
particular case than nationals182. Because of the primacy of art. 34 TFEU, it may happen that 
Member State legislation are not applicable on imported goods while domestic products 
remain subject to strict regulations. However, it is argued that the TFEU does not preclude 
discrimination of residence183. The admissibility of discrimination of residence in such cases is 
only determined according to national law184. However, discrimination of residence violates the 
national principle of equality, and regulatory requirements appear disproportionate185.  
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5.6.  Race to the bottom problem 
In general, the question of the race to the bottom problem is if market participants develop a 
tendency to select countries with the most permissive legislation which might result in 
attempts of other Member States to deregulate and abolish higher standards186. It is to be taken 
into account that in a legislative framework, both the existence of the translation of certain 
requirements into EU standards and harmonization measures establish important 
counterweights to the process of “downward harmonization”187. Reality has shown that 
Member States have begun to act in order to improve the reputation of their home country’s 
systems188. Hence, circumstances are developed for the incremental loosening of host Member 
State compensatory requirements, and consequently for the growing expansion of the 
influence and automaticity of the of principle mutual recognition189.  
 
6.  Solutions  
 
The problems delineated are still being tackled by EU bodies190. Over the years, certain measures have 
been taken to overcome the obstacles and to reach to a principle of mutual recognition that functions 
well191. The solution to the former mentioned problems can be subdivided into five measures 
henceforth described.  
 
6.1.  More effectiveness by introducing a better defined framework 
The first step on the solution to first successfully apply mutual recognition on national level is to 
give the principle a specific text to be applied with well-defined corresponding duties192. Short 
but sound procedures are required that each competent authority planning to take restrictive 
measures in relation to goods will be obliged to follow193. Furthermore, mutual evaluations could 
promote the effectiveness by obliging Member States to notify the Commission of the results of 
national legislation assessments. It will allow Member States to compare their regulatory 
approaches and to simplify, where necessary, their national legal frameworks.  
                                                          
186  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p.104. 
187  PELKMANS, Jacques. “Mutual recognition in goods, on promises and disillusions”. Journal of European Public Policy, 2007, 14 
(5): p. 708. 
188  NICOLAÏDIS, Kalypso. . “Globalization with Human Faces: Managed Mutual Recognition and the free Movement of 
Professionals”, in SCHIOPPA, The Principle of Mutual Recognition..., op.cit., p. 142; JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, 
op.cit., p. 109.  
189  NICOLAÏDIS,“Globalization with Human Faces...”, op.cit., p. 142. 
190  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 109. 
191  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 109. 
192  JANSSENS, The principle of mutual recognition, op.cit., p. 116; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council – First Report on the Application of Regulation, 764/2008 (n 17), p.10. 
193  ECJ, Case C-391/09, Wardyn-Vardyn (2011) ECR I-3787. 
Revista Tribuna Internacional  
Volumen 4 • Nº 8 • 2015 • pp. 143-163 
ISSN 0719-482X (versión en línea)  
 
 
 
161 
6.2.  Seeking for a better understanding  
The base of a functioning principle in general is to guarantee that all parties have a sound 
knowledge of their rights and duties194. The first step has been done by the Commission having 
implemented a large amount of initiatives, which aimed at increasing the diffusion of relevant 
information about the principle of mutual recognition195. Another measure urged by the 
Commission to get to a better understanding of mutual recognition were so-called “mutual 
recognition clauses”196. Although hotly disputed and partly considered as superfluous because 
they are a simple confirmation of the Treaty and directive contents197, practice has shown that 
the use of such non-obligatory clauses198 has enhanced legal certainty and transparency, as they 
call the attention of national authorities and businesses199. 
 
6.3.  Gaining an overview imminent hindress 
A great variety of procedures has been established both a priori and a posteriori to enable the EU 
to detect any paucity in the mutual recognition mechanism when Member States do not 
respect the EU dimension drafting their national instruments200. This two-divided attempt 
implies regular meetings with the competent national administrators during the 
implementation period (example of a priori)201 or measures such as mutual evaluations 
(example of a posteriori)202. By supervising presistently the application of the principle of 
mutual recognition on the ground of notifications, anual reports, and gatherings, the 
Commission is now able to detect the specific category of goods for which mutual recognition 
is still problematic and for which further measures are required203. 
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6.4.  Stimulating administration cooperation 
In order to ensure a proper functioning of compliance control, it is to solve the problem of 
pracitcal barriers - for instance different administrative and working cultures, language barriers 
and a deficiency of exactly identified partners in other EU countries – which still impede 
cooperation frequently204. 
The Single Market Information system (IMI)205 was a first step into the direction of stimulating 
adminstration cooperation206. Concentrating on the non-harmonized areas the perspective is by 
some means less promising. Still there exist no well-functioning standardized cooperation 
between national authorities, regardless of the ECJ jurisdiction on the matter207.  
 
6.5.  Harmonization 
Reality has shown that mutual recognition has certain limits, which must be detected and 
which can only be overcome by harmonization208. Therefore, a coherent combination of the 
principle of mutual recognition and (minimum) harmonization in procedural law is required209.  
The horizontal transfer of sovereignty mentioned before is only acceptable if Member States 
can be sure that EU-wide standardization is not abused by either side to their advantage210. 
Harmonization also  has the function to guarantee this211. As harmonization and mutual 
recognition are complementary integration mechanisms, which are based on the same 
objectives, it is therefore that harmonization can be considered a solution to the mutual 
recognition 212. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
Summing it up, the ECJ case law has played a key role to promote the principle of mutual 
recognition concerning the free movement of goods in EU law. Since the Cassis de Dijon 
judgment, mutual recognition has evolved into the cornerstone of the Single Market – in the 
judicial (and legislative) fields213. As demonstrated, the principle of mutual recognition is 
presumably the most important guideline for the ECJ giving a uniform and autonomous 
interpretation of provisions of EU law. It can be said that the principle of mutual recognition 
helps to overcome legal inequalities between Member States as long as a uniform level of 
protection is ensured. It will especially find an easier application when provisions are already 
largely harmonized and only formal differences must be overcome. 
It has been shown, that the principle of mutual recognition continues to play the pivotal role in 
the Single Market context despite some difficulties in daily practice indicated by the great 
amount of judments. The displayed solutions give a hint of the quantity of options and work 
which is to be done in order to entirely fulfill the principle of mutual recognition. Late 
legislative instruments which seek to improve the workability of mutual recognition indeed 
approved its value and indicate that it stays an issue of high interest for the European 
legislator214. It is to wait what role the ECJ will play in the future concerning the development 
of the principle of mutual recognition in terms of the free movement of goods. 
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